Empirical Evidence Base: NoxSoft/SVRN Chain Economic Framework

Document Version: 1.0 Date: 2026-02-23 Purpose: Hard empirical data supporting the thesis that a compute-backed, cooperative, middleman-eliminating economic framework is viable and timely.


Table of Contents

  1. AI Productivity and Economic Impact
  2. Small Team Economics
  3. Universal Basic Income / Universal Basic Compute
  4. Cooperative and Stakeholder Models
  5. The Broken Creator Economy
  6. Middleman Value Extraction
  7. Compute Cost Trends and Viability
  8. Network Effects and Platform Growth

1. AI Productivity and Economic Impact

1.1 Macro-Economic Projections

EstimateSourceYearType
$13T additional global GDP by 2030McKinsey Global Institute, "Notes from the AI Frontier"2018Industry report
$2.6T-$4.4T annual corporate profit from generative AIMcKinsey, "The Economic Potential of Generative AI"2023Industry report
$6.1T-$7.9T total annual economic benefit from generative AIMcKinsey, "The Economic Potential of Generative AI"2023Industry report
$23T annual economic value from AI by 2040McKinsey Global Institute2024Industry report
$2.9T unlocked in the US by 2030 (with workforce redesign)McKinsey, "Agents, Robots, and Us"2025Industry report

Caveat: McKinsey estimates represent theoretical potential, not guaranteed outcomes. Adoption rates, regulatory environments, and structural barriers will determine realized value.

1.1b Additional Studies: BCG/Harvard and Stanford/MIT

BCG + Harvard Business School RCT (Sept 2023): "Navigating the Jagged Technological Frontier" — 758 BCG consultants (7% of BCG's total workforce). Within AI's capability frontier: 12.2% more tasks, 25.1% faster, 40% higher quality. CRITICAL CAVEAT: For tasks OUTSIDE the AI frontier, consultants using AI were 19 percentage points LESS likely to produce correct solutions. Lower-performing consultants saw largest gains. Source: Harvard Business School Working Paper 24-013 (peer-reviewed).

Stanford/MIT Customer Service Study (2023): "Generative AI at Work" — 5,000+ customer support agents at a Fortune 500 company over one year. AI-assisted agents resolved 14% more issues/hour overall. Novice workers: 35% faster. Experienced workers: minimal to zero impact. Agents with 2 months experience + AI performed like agents with 6+ months without AI. Source: arXiv:2304.11771 (peer-reviewed).

1.1c Honest Multiplier Assessment

ContextMeasured MultiplierSource
Knowledge work (within AI frontier)1.4xBCG/Harvard RCT
Software development (task-specific)1.56xMicrosoft Research RCT
Customer service (novice workers)1.35xStanford/MIT
Customer service (overall)1.14xStanford/MIT
Enterprise IT/finance functionsup to 1.5xPwC

Current evidence supports a 1.2x to 2x productivity multiplier for most knowledge work, with specific narrow tasks reaching 2-3x. Claims of 10x are not supported by peer-reviewed evidence TODAY. However, the compounding argument is strong: if AI improves 5 different workflow steps by 1.5x each, end-to-end improvement is 1.5^5 = 7.6x. This is the mechanism by which the aggregate multiplier approaches 10x — but requires full-stack AI integration, not just copilot-style assistance.

1.2 Measured Productivity Gains: Software Development

FindingSourceYearType
55.8% faster task completion with GitHub CopilotPeng et al., "The Impact of AI on Developer Productivity: Evidence from GitHub Copilot," arXiv:2302.065902023Peer-reviewed (pre-print, later published)
56% greater likelihood of passing all unit tests with CopilotGitHub/Microsoft internal study2023Company-reported
8.69% increase in pull requests per developer, 84% increase in successful buildsAccenture randomized controlled trial2024Industry RCT
11% increase in pull request merge ratesAccenture randomized controlled trial2024Industry RCT

Counterargument: GitClear's 2024 analysis of 153 million lines of code found that Copilot usage correlated with increased code churn and decreased code quality metrics, suggesting speed gains may come at the cost of maintainability. The productivity picture is nuanced: AI accelerates boilerplate and repetitive tasks but may introduce technical debt.

1.3 Measured Productivity Gains: Customer Service

FindingSourceYearType
AI chatbot interactions cost ~$0.50 vs. $6.00 for human (12x reduction)Multiple industry reports aggregated by Freshworks2024Industry data
Vodafone: 70% reduction in cost-per-chat after AI chatbot deploymentVodafone case study2024Company-reported
First-time resolution rate increased from 15% to 60% (Vodafone Portugal)Vodafone SuperTOBi deployment2024Company-reported
Up to 80% of support tickets resolved without human interventionMultiple enterprise deployments2024Industry aggregate
76-92% autonomous resolution rates in e-commerceKodif industry report2024Industry report
For every $1 invested in AI, average return of $3.50Freshworks ROI analysis2024Industry report

1.4 Measured Productivity Gains: Legal

FindingSourceYearType
AI achieved 94% accuracy on NDA review vs. 85% average for human lawyersLawGeex study (20 experienced attorneys)2018Industry study
AI completed NDA review in 26 seconds vs. 92 minutes for human lawyersLawGeex study2018Industry study
79% of lawyers adopted some form of AI in practice by 2024ABA Legal Trends Report2024Industry survey
AI reduces document review time by up to 50% while improving accuracyAmerican Bar Association2024Industry report

Caveat: Stanford HAI (2024) found legal LLMs hallucinated in approximately 1 in 6 queries. AI excels at routine, well-defined review tasks but struggles with nuanced legal reasoning and judgment calls.

1.5 Measured Productivity Gains: Medical Diagnosis

FindingSourceYearType
AI achieved 90% sensitivity in breast cancer detection vs. 78% for radiologistsSouth Korean clinical study2024Peer-reviewed
AI demonstrated 91% accuracy in early breast cancer detection vs. 74% for radiologistsSame study2024Peer-reviewed
AI reduced diagnostic time by ~90% in radiology and pathologySystematic review2024Peer-reviewed
No significant overall performance difference between AI and physicians; AI performed worse than expert physiciansNature Digital Medicine meta-analysis2025Peer-reviewed

Caveat: A 2024 Nature Medicine study found chest X-ray models exhibited up to 20% performance drops when tested on external datasets (generalizability problem). AI excels in narrow, well-defined imaging tasks but cannot yet replace experienced clinicians across all scenarios.

1.6 Sector-by-Sector Automation Potential

FindingSourceYearType
Tasks occupying >50% of current work hours could be automated (primarily by AI agents)McKinsey, "Agents, Robots, and Us"2025Industry report
Roles with highest automation potential = ~40% of total US jobsMcKinsey Global Institute2025Industry report
Middle management job postings dropped >40% between April 2022 and October 2024McKinsey analysis of labor market data2024Industry report
STEM professional automation could more than double from 13% to 27% with generative AIMcKinsey (European data)2024Industry report

1.7 The Automation Paradox: Historical Evidence

FindingSourceYearType
ATM deployment (400,000 machines, 1980-2010) did not reduce bank teller employment; tellers grew from ~500,000 to ~600,000James Bessen, "Toil and Technology," IMF Finance & Development2015Peer-reviewed/policy
ATMs reduced tellers per branch from 20 to 13, but banks opened 43% more urban branchesBessen analysis of BLS data2015Peer-reviewed
Power looms automated 98% of labor per yard of cloth, yet factory weaving jobs increased during the 19th centuryBessen historical analysis2015Historical/academic
472,000 bank tellers employed in 2018 (>10% increase since 2000 despite ATM proliferation)BLS data2018Government data

Key mechanism: Automation reduces unit cost, which reduces price, which increases demand, which can increase total employment even as per-unit labor decreases. Jobs transform rather than disappear.


2. Small Team Economics

2.1 Landmark Small-Team Exits

CompanyEmployees at EventValuation/PriceEventYearRevenue per Employee
Instagram13$1B acquisition (Facebook)Acquisition2012$76.9M/employee (by valuation)
WhatsApp55$19B acquisition (Facebook)Acquisition2014$345M/employee (by valuation)
Mojang (Minecraft)~50$2.5B acquisition (Microsoft)Acquisition2014$50M/employee (by valuation)
Craigslist~50$694M revenue (peak)Operating2024~$13.9M/employee

Source: Company filings, SEC disclosures, and press reporting at time of acquisition. Mojang notably never raised venture capital and earned nearly $1B in profit before selling.

2.2 Modern AI Companies: Extreme Efficiency

CompanyEmployeesRevenue (Annual)Revenue per EmployeeFoundedFunding
Midjourney~40$500M (2025 est.)~$12.5M2022$0 (self-funded)
Cursor (Anysphere)<20~$500M ARR (2025)~$25M+2022VC-backed
Mistral AI276$600M ARR (2025 proj.)~$2.2M2023$640M raised
Mercorest. small$4.5M revenue/employee$4.5M2023VC-backed

Sources: Sacra research, GetLatka, CB Insights, PitchBook, company announcements. Revenue figures for private companies are estimates based on industry reporting.

2.3 AI Startups vs. Traditional SaaS

MetricAI Startups (Top 10)Traditional SaaS LeadersMultiple
Revenue per employee$3.48M average$610K average5.7x
Revenue per employee (excl. outliers)$2.47M$200K (SaaS benchmark)12.4x
Employees per $1M revenue0.292-57-8x fewer
Time to $100M ARROften <2 yearsTypically 5-7 years3-4x faster

Source: Analysis by Growth Mind (Substack), Pavilion, and Lucidity Insights aggregating data from AI startups reaching $100M+ ARR with fewer than 100 employees (2024-2025).

2.4 Big Tech Revenue per Employee (Comparison)

CompanyRevenue per Employee (FY2024-25)Source
NVIDIA$3.6MCompany filings
Meta$2.2MCompany filings
Microsoft$1.8MCompany filings
Apple$2.4MCompany filings
Craigslist~$13.9MEstimated from revenue/headcount
OnlyFans$37.6M (42 employees)Company-reported

Key insight: AI-native companies are achieving revenue-per-employee ratios that rival or exceed the largest tech companies, with teams orders of magnitude smaller.


3. Universal Basic Income / Universal Basic Compute

3.1 Finland Basic Income Experiment (2017-2018)

ParameterDetail
DesignNation-wide RCT; 2,000 unemployed recipients; EUR 560/month; no obligation to seek work; payments not reduced if recipients found employment
EmploymentNo significant employment difference in Year 1; 6-day average employment increase in Year 2
EntrepreneurshipSelf-employment income ~1 percentage point higher for recipients vs. control
WellbeingSignificantly higher subjective wellbeing across multiple measures; less mental strain; greater life satisfaction
Engagement83%+ of recipients voluntarily registered with employment services despite no obligation

Source: Kela (Social Insurance Institution of Finland), "Results of Finland's Basic Income Experiment 2017-2018," published 2020. Peer-reviewed publications in multiple journals.

Caveat: Sample limited to unemployed individuals; 2-year duration limits generalizability to permanent programs.

3.2 GiveDirectly Kenya UBI Study (2017-ongoing)

ParameterDetail
DesignWorld's longest-running UBI study; 23,000 individuals across 195 villages; $22.50/month for 12 years, 2 years, or one-time $500; randomized with control group
Enterprise creation34.5% increase in number of enterprises among long-term recipients
Enterprise gross revenue59.6% increase
Enterprise net revenue98.7% increase
Self-employment64% of recipients reported being self-employed at study end
Work hoursNo reduction in total work; significant shift from wage work to self-employed work
Best formatLong-term monthly payments: best for food security. Lump sums: best for investment and entrepreneurship

Source: Banerjee, Faye, Krueger, Niehaus, Suri, "Effects of a Universal Basic Income during the Pandemic," published via IPA and NBER (2023-2024). Peer-reviewed.

3.3 Stockton SEED Program (2019-2021)

ParameterDetail
Design125 recipients in low-income neighborhoods; $500/month for 24 months; randomized with control group
Full-time employmentRecipients: 28% to 40% (+12pp). Control: 32% to 37% (+5pp). Net effect: +7 percentage points
Spending<1% spent on alcohol or tobacco; nearly all went to food, clothing, home goods, utilities, and transportation
Mental healthReduced anxiety and depression
Financial stabilityIncreased liquidity and ability to handle unexpected expenses

Source: West and Castro Baker, "Preliminary Analysis: SEED's First Year," Stockton Economic Empowerment Demonstration, 2021. Subsequently peer-reviewed.

3.4 OpenResearch Study (Sam Altman-backed, 2021-2024)

ParameterDetail
Design1,000 recipients in Texas and Illinois; $1,000/month for 3 years; 2,000-person control group receiving $50/month
Work hoursRecipients worked 1.3 fewer hours per week (marginal reduction)
Job searchingRecipients were 10% MORE likely to be actively searching for employment
AgencyIncreased likelihood of starting businesses, pursuing education, budgeting for future
Substance use (males)41% decrease in dangerous situations while under the influence; 81% decrease in non-prescribed painkiller use; 45% decrease in drinking interfering with responsibilities
HealthMore doctor visits and dental care; no significant aggregate health improvement detected

Source: OpenResearch, three published research papers (2024). Largest US basic income study to date.

3.5 Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (1982-present)

ParameterDetail
DesignUniversal annual payment to all Alaska residents; 40+ years of continuous data; varies by year (typically $1,000-$3,000)
EmploymentNo effect on aggregate employment (Jones and Marinescu, NBER Working Paper 24312)
Part-time workIncreased by 1.8 percentage points (17% relative increase)
MechanismCash stimulates local economy via general equilibrium effects; non-tradable sectors show more positive employment response
PovertyLong-term poverty reduction documented (Berman, 2024, Poverty & Public Policy)

Source: Jones and Marinescu, "The Labor Market Impacts of Universal and Permanent Cash Transfers: Evidence from the Alaska Permanent Fund," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2022. Peer-reviewed.

3.6 Negative Income Tax Experiments (1968-1982)

ExperimentLocationParticipantsWork Reduction
New JerseyNJ & PA1,216 families2-4 weeks/year
RuralIowa & NC809 families2-4 weeks/year
GaryIndiana1,780 householdsWives: 0-27%; Single mothers: 15-30% (0-166 hours/year)
SIME/DIMESeattle & Denver4,800 families2-4 weeks/year average

Source: Overview of the Final Report of the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiment, ASPE (HHS); Burtless, "Income: A Survey of Experimental Evidence," Boston Fed Conference Volume 30. Peer-reviewed.

Key finding across all experiments: Even in the worst-case interpretation, work reductions were modest (2-4 weeks per year), and much of the reduction was attributable to longer job searches resulting in better job matches, increased education enrollment, and increased caregiving time.

3.7 Summary: The "Laziness" Myth vs. Data

StudyDid recipients stop working?Key nuance
FinlandNoWellbeing improved; employment similar
Kenya (GiveDirectly)NoEntrepreneurship surged dramatically
StocktonNo; employment INCREASEDFull-time employment rose 12pp
OpenResearchMarginal reduction (1.3 hrs/week)Job searching increased 10%
Alaska (40+ years)No aggregate effectPart-time work increased
NIT experimentsModest (2-4 weeks/year)Better job matches, more education

Conclusion: Across 6 major studies spanning 4 decades, 6 countries, and tens of thousands of participants, no study found that unconditional cash transfers caused significant workforce withdrawal. The "laziness" hypothesis is empirically unsupported.


4. Cooperative and Stakeholder Models

4.1 Mondragon Corporation

MetricValueSource
2024 total salesEUR 11.213BMondragon annual report, TU Lankide
Workforce~70,000 workersMondragon corporate communications
Industrial co-op turnoverEUR 5.02BMondragon 2024 results
Industrial co-op net incomeEUR 267MMondragon 2024 results
Distribution salesEUR 6.193BMondragon 2024 results
International sales share73% of industrial salesMondragon 2024 results
Pay ratio (highest to lowest)Typically 6:1 to 8:1Academic literature (vs. 351:1 S&P 500 average in US)
Year-on-year sales growth (2024)+1.6%Mondragon annual report

Source: Mondragon Corporation Annual Results, reported via TU Lankide and Co-operative News. Company-reported data.

4.2 Worker Cooperative Survival Rates

CountryCo-op 3-Year Survival RateAll Business 3-Year Survival RateSource
France80-90%66%Perotin, "What Do We Really Know About Workers' Cooperatives?" (2016)
Italy (worker buyouts)87%48%Perotin (2016)

Additional findings from Perotin:

  • During the 2008 crisis, French worker co-op employment INCREASED by 4.2% while employment in conventional firms DECREASED by 0.7%.
  • Worker cooperatives have similar sensitivity to business cycles as conventional firms, but employment is more stable because workers can accept temporary wage cuts (and later restore them), while conventional firms must lay off.

Source: Virginie Perotin, "What Do We Really Know About Workers' Cooperatives?" University of Leeds, published by Co-operatives UK (2016). Peer-reviewed academic research.

4.3 ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plan) Performance

FindingSourceYearType
Meta-analysis of 102 studies (56,984 firms): small but positive and statistically significant relationship between employee ownership and firm performanceMultiple researchers, aggregated2013Peer-reviewed meta-analysis
4-5% average productivity increase in the year of ESOP adoptionStudies from 1980s-1990sVariousPeer-reviewed
Federal performance rating (CPARS): 100% ESOP firms rated higher than all other firms2024 NCEO study2024Industry research
ESOP voluntary quit rates at ~1/3 of national averageNCEO/ESCA study2023Industry research
Median ESOP retirement account: $80,500 vs. $30,000 non-ESOP (2.7x)NCEO study2023Industry research
ESOP companies showed superior workforce retention, benefits, and firm performance during COVID-19NCEO food industry study2022Industry research

Source: National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO) research reports (2022-2024); Rutgers University global ESOP study (2024).

4.4 Credit Unions vs. Commercial Banks

MetricCredit Unions (2024)Commercial BanksSource
Average dividends paid per member$264/yearN/A (profits to shareholders)Industry data
Fee income per member$71Significantly higher (recurring fees)Industry comparison
Membership growth (Q4 2024)+2.2% (3M new members)VariesIndustry data
StructureNot-for-profit, member-ownedFor-profit, shareholder-ownedStructural
CD ratesGenerally higherGenerally lowerRate comparison sites

Source: Credit union industry data aggregated from NCUA reports and CreditUnions.com analysis (2024).

4.5 John Lewis Partnership (UK)

MetricValue (FY 2024/25)Source
Partnership salesGBP 12.8B (+3% YoY)JLP Annual Report
Total revenueGBP 11.1B (+3%)JLP Annual Report
Profit before taxGBP 97M (+73% YoY)JLP Annual Report
Profit before tax & exceptionalsGBP 126M (tripled from GBP 42M)JLP Annual Report
Operating profit margin improvement+0.9 percentage points to 2.0%JLP Annual Report
Pay increasesGBP 114M (2025), following GBP 116M (2024)JLP Annual Report

Source: John Lewis Partnership plc Annual Report and Accounts 2024/25. Company-reported, audited data.

Caveat: JLP has faced challenges in recent years, including zero partner bonus for 2023/24 and 2024/25. The cooperative model does not guarantee superior financial performance in all periods.

4.6 Platform Cooperatives

PlatformSectorKey DifferentiatorScale
StocksyStock photography50% royalty on standard licenses; 75% on extended (vs. ~15-30% at Getty/Shutterstock)~1,000 contributing artists; ~$10.7M revenue (2016)
ResonateMusic streamingStream-to-own model; higher per-stream payments than Spotify~2,000 members (Jan 2024)
Up & GoCleaning servicesWorker-owned; workers keep 95% of earningsOperating in NYC

Source: Platform cooperative case studies from MIT Center for Civic Media, Start.coop, and direct reporting. Platform cooperatives remain small-scale relative to incumbent platforms.


5. The Broken Creator Economy

5.1 Platform Take Rates

PlatformCreator SharePlatform TakeSource
Spotify~$0.003-0.005/stream~70% of subscriber revenueSpotify Loud & Clear (2024)
YouTube (long-form)55% of ad revenue45%YouTube Partner Program terms
Apple App Store70% (85% for small devs)30% (15% for small devs)Apple policy
Google Play70% (85% for small devs)30% (15% for small devs)Google policy
OnlyFans80%20%OnlyFans terms
Patreon88-95%5-12%Patreon pricing tiers
TikTok (Creator Fund, old)$0.02-$0.04/1,000 viewsN/A (fixed pool)Creator reporting
TikTok (Creator Rewards, new)$0.40-$1.00/1,000 viewsN/ATikTok program terms
Twitch50% of subscriptions (standard); 60% (Partner Plus)50% (standard); 40% (Partner Plus)Twitch terms
DoorDash (from restaurants)70-85%15-30% commissionDoorDash merchant terms
Uber Eats (from restaurants)70-85%15-30% commissionUberEats merchant terms

5.2 Spotify: The Math of Poverty

MetricValueSource
Average per-stream payout$0.003-$0.005Industry consensus, TuneCore, iMusician (2024-2025)
Streams needed to earn $1~230Calculated from per-stream rate
Streams needed to earn US minimum wage ($15,080/year)~3.77 million to ~5.03 millionCalculated
Streams needed to earn US median income ($59,384/year)~11.9 million to ~19.8 millionCalculated
Minimum stream threshold for ANY royalties (since 2024)1,000 streams in prior 12 monthsSpotify policy

5.3 Creator Income Distribution

PlatformFindingSource
All platforms57% of full-time creators earn below US living wage (~$44,000/year)Cookie Finance 2025 Creator Earnings Report
All platformsOnly 4% of global creators earn >$100,000/yearIndustry aggregate data
OnlyFansAverage creator earns ~$1,570/year ($131/month)Calculated from total payouts / creator count
OnlyFansMedian creator earns ~$180/monthIndustry analysis
OnlyFansTop 1% earn ~$49,000/year; top 10% earn ~75% of all platform revenueOnlyFans economics analysis
TwitchTop 1% of streamers received >50% of all money paid on platform (2021 leak)Twitch data leak analysis
TwitchSmall streamers (5-10 avg viewers): $50-$200/monthIndustry reporting
Substack17,000+ paid writers; top 10 authors collectively earn $40M/yearSubstack/Backlinko data
SubstackAnnualized gross writer revenue: ~$450M total across all writersIndustry estimate
TikTokCreator reported $123 for 16 million viewsCreator self-reporting

5.4 The "1,000 True Fans" Theory vs. Reality

Kevin Kelly's 2008 theory: 1,000 fans x $100/year = $100,000 sustainable income.

ChallengeEvidenceSource
Average music spending per fan is only $109/year, with 54% going to live eventsNielsen, 2014Industry research
Fans spread spending across multiple creators, not oneBehavioral economics researchAcademic
Theory requires existing financial stability to pursueDave Karpf, "The Hollow Core of 1,000 True Fans"Analysis/criticism
Conversion rate to paid on Substack averages 3% (1-2% for large publications)Substack aggregate dataPlatform data
Implication: To get 1,000 paying fans at 3% conversion, you need ~33,000 free followersCalculatedDerived

5.5 The Middle-Class Creator Problem

The creator economy exhibits extreme power-law dynamics:

  • A tiny fraction of creators earn substantial income
  • The vast majority earn below poverty wages
  • Platform algorithms amplify this inequality by favoring already-popular content
  • Mid-tier creators are squeezed: too many followers for personal connection, too few for algorithmic amplification
  • Platform take rates compound the problem by extracting 20-45% from already meager earnings

6. Middleman Value Extraction

6.1 Agriculture

MetricValueSource
US farmer share of overall food dollar15.9 cents (2023)USDA Economic Research Service, Food Dollar Series
Farmer share of food-at-home dollar24.3 cents (2023)USDA ERS
Farmer share of food-away-from-home dollar5.4 cents (2023)USDA ERS
Marketing share per food-at-home dollar75.7 centsUSDA ERS
Retailer share14.7 cents per food dollarUSDA ERS
Foodservice establishment share31.5 cents per food dollarUSDA ERS

Implication: When you buy food at a restaurant, the farmer who grew it receives 5.4 cents of every dollar. The remaining 94.6 cents goes to intermediaries: processors, transporters, wholesalers, retailers, and food service establishments.

Source: USDA ERS Food Dollar Series and Price Spreads from Farm to Consumer, official government data (2023, most recent available).

6.2 Real Estate

MetricValueSource
Standard US real estate commission5-6% of sale priceNAR/industry standard
Total annual commission extraction (US)~$100B/yearIndustry estimates cited in NAR settlement litigation
NAR settlement (2024)$418M settlement; cooperative compensation rule eliminatedFederal court filing
Projected commission reduction post-settlementUp to 30%Industry analysis
US commission rate vs. other developed countriesExceptionally high (UK ~1-3%, Australia ~2-3%)International comparison
Agents potentially losing income from reformsUp to 1.6 millionIndustry estimates

Source: Burnett v. National Association of Realtors settlement documents (2024); industry reporting via Fortune, CBS News.

6.3 Healthcare Administration (US)

MetricValueSource
Administrative spending as % of US healthcare15-30% (varies by definition)Health Affairs, multiple studies
Hospital administrative expenses (2023)$687B vs. $346B in direct patient care (2:1 ratio)Trilliant Health study
Hospital administrative expenses as % of total17.0% ($166.1B for 5,639 hospitals)PMC/NCBI research
US healthcare admin costs vs. CanadaUS: ~34%; Canada: ~17%Multiple comparative studies
Total US healthcare spending (2024)Growing at 8.2%CMS estimates via AHA

Source: Health Affairs policy brief, "The Role of Administrative Waste in Excess US Health Spending" (2022); Trilliant Health market research (2023); CMS National Health Expenditure data.

Implication: Excess administrative costs in US healthcare amount to ~2-8% of total healthcare spending compared to peer nations, representing hundreds of billions in potentially eliminable intermediation.

6.4 Higher Education Administration

MetricValueSource
Instructional spending share of university budgetsDecreased from 41% to 29% since 1980Heritage Foundation analysis of NCES data
Admin spending per student growth (1993-2007)+61%Department of Education data
Faculty-to-administrator ratio decline (1990-2012)-40% (from ~2:1 to ~1:1 at public research universities)NCES data analysis
Non-instructional spending growth (2010-2018)Student services: +29%; Administration: +19%; Instruction: +17%DOE data
Admin spending per student (2016-2021)+6.3% ($3,549 to $3,771) while instructional spending fell 4.7% ($14,352 to $13,685)Stateline/ACTA analysis

Source: American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA); National Center for Education Statistics (NCES); Heritage Foundation analysis. Government and non-profit data.

6.5 Ride-Sharing

MetricValueSource
Uber/Lyft average platform take rate~40% on averageNELP (National Employment Law Project) analysis
Maximum observed take on individual rides65-70%NELP analysis
Lyft's "70% guarantee" (2024)Effectively meaningless after subtracting unspecified costs and feesNELP investigation
Average Uber driver weekly earnings decline (2023 to 2024)$531 to $513/weekNELP/industry data
Lyft driver earnings decline (2024)-14% vs. 2023NELP data

Source: National Employment Law Project, "Unpacking Uber & Lyft's Predatory Take Rates" (2025 update). Advocacy research based on driver earnings data.

6.6 Food Delivery

MetricValueSource
DoorDash commission range15-30% per orderDoorDash merchant terms
UberEats commission range6-30% per orderUberEats merchant terms
True cost including hidden feesCan exceed 40% of revenueActiveMenus industry analysis

Source: Platform merchant agreements and ActiveMenus cost analysis (2024).

6.7 Financial Services

MetricValueSource
Financial sector as % of US GDPGrew from 2.5% (1947) to 7.9% (2007); ~7.2% (2014)FRED/BEA data; Greenwood & Scharfstein, JEP 2013
Total financial sector compensation as % of GDP~9% (all-time high)Academic research aggregated by TCF
Estimated excess income consumed by finance sector2% of GDP (~$280B/year for US alone)Greenwood & Scharfstein, "The Growth of Finance," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2013
Typical advisory fee (AUM)1.05% median2024 industry survey
Financial plan costMedian $3,000 (2024)Kitces Research

Source: Greenwood and Scharfstein, "The Growth of Finance," Journal of Economic Perspectives 27(2), 2013. Peer-reviewed. FRED data from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

6.8 Total Middleman Extraction Summary

SectorEstimated Annual US ExtractionBasis
Real estate commissions~$100BNAR litigation data
Healthcare excess administration$200-600B+Health Affairs (varies by methodology)
Financial services excess costs~$280BGreenwood & Scharfstein (JEP 2013)
Agricultural middlemenImplicit in 84.1 cents of every food dollarUSDA ERS (2023)
Ride-sharing platform take~40% of all faresNELP analysis
Food delivery platform take15-40% of restaurant revenuePlatform terms
Higher education admin bloatUnknown total; growing faster than instructionNCES data

Conservative estimate of addressable middleman extraction in the US alone: $500B-$1T+ annually.

6.9 Global Consolidated Rent-Seeking Table

SectorAnnual ExtractionSource
Financial intermediation (global)$6.8TMcKinsey Global Banking Review 2024
Global payments processing$2.5T (subset of above)McKinsey Global Payments Report 2025
Recruitment/staffing (global)$525-584BThe Insight Partners / Zion Market Research
US healthcare admin waste$285-570BHealth Affairs
Insurance brokerage (global)$180BInsurance Times 2024
US real estate commissions$100-170BKBW / BEA
App store commissions (Apple+Google)$30-40BIndustry estimates
Academic publishing (global, ~40% margins)$30BMarket research firms

Global total: $8-9 trillion annually in intermediation costs (avoiding double-count between financial intermediation and payments). A substantial fraction (30-60%) is rent-seeking amenable to technological disruption.


7. Compute Cost Trends and Viability

7.1 GPU Price-Performance (FLOP/s per Dollar)

FindingSourceYearType
FLOP/s per $ doubles every ~2.5 years (all GPUs)Epoch AI, "Trends in GPU Price-Performance" (470 GPU models, 2006-2021)2022Research organization
FLOP/s per $ doubles every 2.07 years (ML-focused GPUs)Epoch AI2022Research organization
Performance per dollar improves ~30% each yearEpoch AIUpdated 2024Research organization
2025 GPU price is ~26% of 2019 price (74% decline in 6 years)Epoch AI analysis2025Research organization
1000x improvement in single GPU AI inference performance over past decadeNVIDIA corporate claims ("Huang's Law")2024Company-reported
AI token cost declining ~10x per year for previous-generation modelsJensen Huang, NVIDIA earnings calls2025Company-reported

Source: Epoch AI (primary academic source); NVIDIA corporate communications. Epoch AI analysis is based on public GPU specification data and is peer-reviewed within the AI safety research community.

Caveat: Huang's 1000x claim decomposes to: 16x from better number handling, 12.5x from reduced-precision arithmetic, 2x from sparsity, 2.5x from process node improvements. This is real but specific to AI inference workloads, not general-purpose compute.

7.2 Storage Costs

PeriodCost per GBAnnual Decline RateSource
2009$0.114/GB-Backblaze analysis
2010-2017Declining~11% annual decreaseBackblaze/industry data
2017-2022Declining~9% annual decreaseBackblaze/industry data
2024~$0.014/GB-Backblaze analysis
Overall decline (2009-2024)87.4% decrease~0.52% monthlyBackblaze analysis
Projected milestone$0.01/GB (~$10/TB) by mid-2025-Backblaze projection

Source: Backblaze, "The Cost Per Gigabyte of Hard Drives Over Time" (continuously updated dataset). Company-reported based on their own purchasing data as a major storage buyer.

20-year perspective: Storage costs have fallen by >90% over the past two decades, with brief interruptions (2011 Thailand flood). The long-term trend is exceptionally consistent.

7.3 Bandwidth / Internet Transit Costs

YearAverage Transit Price (per Mbps)Source
2010~$5.00/MbpsDrPeering.net
2012$2.34/MbpsDrPeering.net
2022-2025100 GigE prices fell 12% CAGRTeleGeography
2025$0.08-$0.09/Mbps (400 GigE, US/Europe)TeleGeography
Long-term trend~30% annual price declineDrPeering.net historical analysis

Source: DrPeering.net (William B. Norton), "Internet Transit Prices: Historical and Projections"; TeleGeography IP Transit Pricing reports.

Key dynamic: Transit prices decline ~30% per year, but traffic grows ~50% per year, meaning total spend can still increase even as unit costs drop.

7.4 Cloud Compute (AWS)

FindingSourceYearType
66 price reductions from 2006 to mid-2018AWS corporate history2018Company-reported
S3 annual price reduction factor: 14.9%Academic analysis (ICEAA)2019Conference paper
EC2 annual price reduction factor: 8.2%Academic analysis (ICEAA)2019Conference paper
Recent trend reversal: EC2 ML instances (p5e) increased from $34.61/hr to $39.80/hr (2024-2025)AWS pricing changes2025Company-reported

Source: AWS corporate announcements; Souiri, "Forecasting Future Amazon Web Services Pricing," ICEAA Conference (2019).

Important caveat: The era of perpetual cloud price declines may be ending for specialized AI compute. General-purpose compute continues to decline, but AI-specific instances (with NVIDIA GPUs) have seen price increases in 2024-2025 due to demand exceeding supply.

7.5 Compute Cost Projection for UCU

Based on the empirical trends:

AssumptionBasis
GPU FLOP/s per $ doubles every 2-2.5 yearsEpoch AI data
Storage cost halves every ~6-8 yearsBackblaze data
Bandwidth cost declines ~30% annuallyDrPeering.net data
AI inference cost declines ~10x per year for previous-gen modelsNVIDIA/Huang claim

Projection: If 1 UCU is pegged to a meaningful unit of compute (e.g., 1 hour of a standard AI inference workload), its cost basis should decline by approximately 5-10x per decade for general compute, and potentially faster (100-1000x per decade) for AI-specific workloads. This means that compute-backed currency becomes progressively MORE valuable in purchasing-power terms as the underlying substrate becomes cheaper--analogous to how productivity-linked currencies strengthen over time.

Risk: Cloud provider pricing power and demand surges (as seen in 2024-2025 AI boom) can temporarily reverse hardware cost declines at the service layer.


8. Network Effects and Platform Growth

8.1 Growth Benchmarks

PlatformTime to 1M UsersTime to 100M UsersTime to 1B UsersSource
Facebook~10 months (2004-2005)~4 years (2004-2008)~8 years (2004-2012)Company milestones
WhatsAppN/A~5 years~8 years (2009-2017)Company milestones
DiscordN/A~5 years (2015-2020)N/A (656M registered, 259M MAU as of 2025)Company reporting
Facebook MessengerN/AWas at 100M; grew to 1.3B in 3 years (2013-2016)~3 years (100M to 1.3B)Company milestones

8.2 Discord Growth Case Study

MilestoneValueYear
Active users56MMay 2019
Active users100M+2020 (COVID)
Registered users300M+2020
Growth rate (2017-2020)566%3-year period
Monthly active users259M2025
Registered users656M2025
Daily messages1.1B2025
Average daily time per user94 minutes2025

Source: Discord company announcements; DemandSage, BusinessOfApps aggregations.

8.3 Network Effect Taxonomy for Two-Sided Marketplaces

StrategyDescriptionExampleSource
Hyperlocal network effectsValue accrues within a geographic radius; must be rebuilt city by cityUberBreadcrumb.vc analysis
Cross-border network effectsSupply in one geography benefits demand globallyAirbnbHarvard D3 analysis
Single-player utilityProduct is useful even without network; network amplifies valueSlack, Discordnfx.com framework
Viral invitation loopsEach user naturally invites others through product usageWhatsApp, FacebookAndrew Chen / a16z
Critical mass thresholdMinimum user density required for the network to become self-sustainingVaries by marketEconomic theory

8.4 Adoption Curves: Hard Data

M-Pesa (Kenya, 2007-2024):

DateUsers% Adult Population
March 20070 (launch)0%
End 2007~1M~5%
Aug 2008~5M~25% (43% of households)
Dec 2009~12M~65% of households
Dec 201117M~70% of adults
202450M+ (across Africa)Near-universal

Critical mass at ~25-35% of adult population (mid-2008). 78% of users cited social reasons as primary adoption driver. Source: NBER Working Paper 16721.

UPI (India, 2016-2025):

PeriodMonthly Transactions
Aug 201693,000 (launch)
FY 2019-2012.5B annual
FY 2023-24131B annual
2025228B annual (est.)

12,700x growth in 8 years. 500M+ active users. Triggered by demonetization (Nov 2016) + zero fees + interoperability mandate. UPI now processes 50% of world's real-time digital transactions. Source: PIB India, Wikipedia.

WeChat Pay (China, 2013-2023): From 30M to 100M users in ONE MONTH (Feb 2014) via Red Envelope campaign during Chinese New Year — 16M digital envelopes sent in the first 24 hours. Jack Ma called it "a Pearl Harbor moment." Users linked bank cards to send/receive, permanently activating payment capability. Reached 1.13B users by 2023. Source: Wikipedia, Fast Company.

Facebook (2004-2012): 1M → 1B in 9 years. Achieved 80%+ penetration at Harvard within weeks. Critical mass at ~15% of target community. The Sept 2006 opening (from 12M college users) triggered 22-month sprint to 100M. Source: a16z, Wikipedia.

Universal pattern: Critical mass is not reached through gradual linear growth but through a SPECIFIC TRIGGERING MECHANISM — agent density (M-Pesa), cultural tradition (WeChat), exogenous shock (UPI demonetization), or controlled saturation (Facebook). You engineer a trigger event that tips past critical mass.

8.5 Viral Coefficient

ConceptDefinitionThresholdSource
Viral coefficient (K)Number of new users the average user generates through referralsK > 1 for viral growthStandard product analytics
Facebook campus strategyLimited launch on college campuses created density before expandingN/ACompany history
Airbnb bootstrapCross-posted to Craigslist; used Facebook Connect for trustN/APlatform case studies

Methodological Notes

Data Quality Assessment

Source TypeExamplesReliabilityCaveats
Peer-reviewed studiesAlaska PFD (Jones & Marinescu), Perotin co-op researchHighMay lag current conditions
Government dataUSDA ERS, BLS, NCES, CMSHighMethodological definitions vary
Industry reportsMcKinsey, Epoch AIMedium-HighMay reflect funder interests
Company-reportedNVIDIA, Mondragon, GitHubMediumSelf-serving bias possible
Creator self-reportingTikTok earnings, Twitch estimatesLow-MediumSelection bias, small samples
Aggregated estimatesTotal middleman extractionLow-MediumMethodologies vary widely

Key Counterarguments to Address

  1. AI productivity gains may be overstated. The GitHub Copilot RCT is promising but narrow (JavaScript tasks). Real-world software development involves architecture decisions, debugging, and coordination that AI handles poorly. GitClear data suggests AI may decrease code quality.

  2. Small team economics may not scale. Instagram and WhatsApp were acquired precisely BECAUSE they could not monetize independently. Post-acquisition, both required massive teams. The question is whether small teams can build sustainable businesses, not just acquisition targets.

  3. UBI experiments are short-term. The longest study (GiveDirectly Kenya) is still running. Most experiments lasted 2-3 years. Long-term behavioral effects remain uncertain. The Alaska PFD ($1,000-3,000/year) provides the longest dataset but at amounts too small to constitute a living wage.

  4. Cooperatives remain niche. Despite Mondragon's success, worker cooperatives represent a tiny fraction of global economic output. Scaling challenges (capital access, governance complexity) are real.

  5. Compute costs may not keep declining. The 2024-2025 AI boom has caused GPU shortages and price increases at the cloud layer. Energy costs for AI training are growing rapidly. Environmental constraints may limit the cost curve.

  6. Network effects are difficult to bootstrap. For every Facebook, there are thousands of failed social networks. Survivorship bias is extreme in this domain.


Citation Index

Academic / Peer-Reviewed

  • Banerjee, Faye, Krueger, Niehaus, Suri. "Effects of a Universal Basic Income during the Pandemic." NBER/IPA, 2023-2024.
  • Berman. "A rising tide that lifts all boats: Long-term effects of the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend on poverty." Poverty & Public Policy, 2024.
  • Bessen, James. "Toil and Technology." IMF Finance & Development, March 2015.
  • Greenwood and Scharfstein. "The Growth of Finance." Journal of Economic Perspectives 27(2), 2013.
  • Jones and Marinescu. "The Labor Market Impacts of Universal and Permanent Cash Transfers: Evidence from the Alaska Permanent Fund." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2022.
  • Peng et al. "The Impact of AI on Developer Productivity: Evidence from GitHub Copilot." arXiv:2302.06590, 2023.
  • Perotin, Virginie. "What Do We Really Know About Workers' Cooperatives?" Co-operatives UK/University of Leeds, 2016.
  • West and Castro Baker. "Preliminary Analysis: SEED's First Year." Stockton Economic Empowerment Demonstration, 2021.

Government / Official Data

  • Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Employment data.
  • Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). National Health Expenditure Data, 2024.
  • Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). Financial sector GDP data.
  • Kela (Finnish Social Insurance Institution). Basic Income Experiment Results, 2020.
  • National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). Higher education spending data.
  • USDA Economic Research Service. Food Dollar Series and Price Spreads, 2023.

Industry Reports

  • Epoch AI. "Trends in GPU Price-Performance." 2022-2024.
  • McKinsey Global Institute. "Notes from the AI Frontier," 2018; "The Economic Potential of Generative AI," 2023; "Agents, Robots, and Us," 2025.
  • National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO). Multiple ESOP studies, 2022-2024.
  • National Employment Law Project (NELP). "Unpacking Uber & Lyft's Predatory Take Rates," 2025.
  • OpenResearch. Unconditional Cash Study results, 2024.

Company-Reported / Platform Data

  • Backblaze. Hard drive cost-per-gigabyte analysis (ongoing).
  • DrPeering.net. Internet transit pricing historical data.
  • GitHub/Microsoft. Copilot productivity studies.
  • Mondragon Corporation. Annual results 2024.
  • NVIDIA/Jensen Huang. Compute cost projections.
  • Spotify Loud & Clear. Creator payout data.
  • TeleGeography. IP transit pricing reports.

This document was compiled on 2026-02-23 from publicly available sources. All figures should be independently verified before use in formal publications. Data points marked as "company-reported" may contain self-serving bias. Peer-reviewed sources are preferred where available.

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