Empirical Evidence Base: NoxSoft/SVRN Chain Economic Framework
Document Version: 1.0 Date: 2026-02-23 Purpose: Hard empirical data supporting the thesis that a compute-backed, cooperative, middleman-eliminating economic framework is viable and timely.
Table of Contents
- AI Productivity and Economic Impact
- Small Team Economics
- Universal Basic Income / Universal Basic Compute
- Cooperative and Stakeholder Models
- The Broken Creator Economy
- Middleman Value Extraction
- Compute Cost Trends and Viability
- Network Effects and Platform Growth
1. AI Productivity and Economic Impact
1.1 Macro-Economic Projections
| Estimate | Source | Year | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| $13T additional global GDP by 2030 | McKinsey Global Institute, "Notes from the AI Frontier" | 2018 | Industry report |
| $2.6T-$4.4T annual corporate profit from generative AI | McKinsey, "The Economic Potential of Generative AI" | 2023 | Industry report |
| $6.1T-$7.9T total annual economic benefit from generative AI | McKinsey, "The Economic Potential of Generative AI" | 2023 | Industry report |
| $23T annual economic value from AI by 2040 | McKinsey Global Institute | 2024 | Industry report |
| $2.9T unlocked in the US by 2030 (with workforce redesign) | McKinsey, "Agents, Robots, and Us" | 2025 | Industry report |
Caveat: McKinsey estimates represent theoretical potential, not guaranteed outcomes. Adoption rates, regulatory environments, and structural barriers will determine realized value.
1.1b Additional Studies: BCG/Harvard and Stanford/MIT
BCG + Harvard Business School RCT (Sept 2023): "Navigating the Jagged Technological Frontier" — 758 BCG consultants (7% of BCG's total workforce). Within AI's capability frontier: 12.2% more tasks, 25.1% faster, 40% higher quality. CRITICAL CAVEAT: For tasks OUTSIDE the AI frontier, consultants using AI were 19 percentage points LESS likely to produce correct solutions. Lower-performing consultants saw largest gains. Source: Harvard Business School Working Paper 24-013 (peer-reviewed).
Stanford/MIT Customer Service Study (2023): "Generative AI at Work" — 5,000+ customer support agents at a Fortune 500 company over one year. AI-assisted agents resolved 14% more issues/hour overall. Novice workers: 35% faster. Experienced workers: minimal to zero impact. Agents with 2 months experience + AI performed like agents with 6+ months without AI. Source: arXiv:2304.11771 (peer-reviewed).
1.1c Honest Multiplier Assessment
| Context | Measured Multiplier | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Knowledge work (within AI frontier) | 1.4x | BCG/Harvard RCT |
| Software development (task-specific) | 1.56x | Microsoft Research RCT |
| Customer service (novice workers) | 1.35x | Stanford/MIT |
| Customer service (overall) | 1.14x | Stanford/MIT |
| Enterprise IT/finance functions | up to 1.5x | PwC |
Current evidence supports a 1.2x to 2x productivity multiplier for most knowledge work, with specific narrow tasks reaching 2-3x. Claims of 10x are not supported by peer-reviewed evidence TODAY. However, the compounding argument is strong: if AI improves 5 different workflow steps by 1.5x each, end-to-end improvement is 1.5^5 = 7.6x. This is the mechanism by which the aggregate multiplier approaches 10x — but requires full-stack AI integration, not just copilot-style assistance.
1.2 Measured Productivity Gains: Software Development
| Finding | Source | Year | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| 55.8% faster task completion with GitHub Copilot | Peng et al., "The Impact of AI on Developer Productivity: Evidence from GitHub Copilot," arXiv:2302.06590 | 2023 | Peer-reviewed (pre-print, later published) |
| 56% greater likelihood of passing all unit tests with Copilot | GitHub/Microsoft internal study | 2023 | Company-reported |
| 8.69% increase in pull requests per developer, 84% increase in successful builds | Accenture randomized controlled trial | 2024 | Industry RCT |
| 11% increase in pull request merge rates | Accenture randomized controlled trial | 2024 | Industry RCT |
Counterargument: GitClear's 2024 analysis of 153 million lines of code found that Copilot usage correlated with increased code churn and decreased code quality metrics, suggesting speed gains may come at the cost of maintainability. The productivity picture is nuanced: AI accelerates boilerplate and repetitive tasks but may introduce technical debt.
1.3 Measured Productivity Gains: Customer Service
| Finding | Source | Year | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| AI chatbot interactions cost ~$0.50 vs. $6.00 for human (12x reduction) | Multiple industry reports aggregated by Freshworks | 2024 | Industry data |
| Vodafone: 70% reduction in cost-per-chat after AI chatbot deployment | Vodafone case study | 2024 | Company-reported |
| First-time resolution rate increased from 15% to 60% (Vodafone Portugal) | Vodafone SuperTOBi deployment | 2024 | Company-reported |
| Up to 80% of support tickets resolved without human intervention | Multiple enterprise deployments | 2024 | Industry aggregate |
| 76-92% autonomous resolution rates in e-commerce | Kodif industry report | 2024 | Industry report |
| For every $1 invested in AI, average return of $3.50 | Freshworks ROI analysis | 2024 | Industry report |
1.4 Measured Productivity Gains: Legal
| Finding | Source | Year | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| AI achieved 94% accuracy on NDA review vs. 85% average for human lawyers | LawGeex study (20 experienced attorneys) | 2018 | Industry study |
| AI completed NDA review in 26 seconds vs. 92 minutes for human lawyers | LawGeex study | 2018 | Industry study |
| 79% of lawyers adopted some form of AI in practice by 2024 | ABA Legal Trends Report | 2024 | Industry survey |
| AI reduces document review time by up to 50% while improving accuracy | American Bar Association | 2024 | Industry report |
Caveat: Stanford HAI (2024) found legal LLMs hallucinated in approximately 1 in 6 queries. AI excels at routine, well-defined review tasks but struggles with nuanced legal reasoning and judgment calls.
1.5 Measured Productivity Gains: Medical Diagnosis
| Finding | Source | Year | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| AI achieved 90% sensitivity in breast cancer detection vs. 78% for radiologists | South Korean clinical study | 2024 | Peer-reviewed |
| AI demonstrated 91% accuracy in early breast cancer detection vs. 74% for radiologists | Same study | 2024 | Peer-reviewed |
| AI reduced diagnostic time by ~90% in radiology and pathology | Systematic review | 2024 | Peer-reviewed |
| No significant overall performance difference between AI and physicians; AI performed worse than expert physicians | Nature Digital Medicine meta-analysis | 2025 | Peer-reviewed |
Caveat: A 2024 Nature Medicine study found chest X-ray models exhibited up to 20% performance drops when tested on external datasets (generalizability problem). AI excels in narrow, well-defined imaging tasks but cannot yet replace experienced clinicians across all scenarios.
1.6 Sector-by-Sector Automation Potential
| Finding | Source | Year | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tasks occupying >50% of current work hours could be automated (primarily by AI agents) | McKinsey, "Agents, Robots, and Us" | 2025 | Industry report |
| Roles with highest automation potential = ~40% of total US jobs | McKinsey Global Institute | 2025 | Industry report |
| Middle management job postings dropped >40% between April 2022 and October 2024 | McKinsey analysis of labor market data | 2024 | Industry report |
| STEM professional automation could more than double from 13% to 27% with generative AI | McKinsey (European data) | 2024 | Industry report |
1.7 The Automation Paradox: Historical Evidence
| Finding | Source | Year | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| ATM deployment (400,000 machines, 1980-2010) did not reduce bank teller employment; tellers grew from ~500,000 to ~600,000 | James Bessen, "Toil and Technology," IMF Finance & Development | 2015 | Peer-reviewed/policy |
| ATMs reduced tellers per branch from 20 to 13, but banks opened 43% more urban branches | Bessen analysis of BLS data | 2015 | Peer-reviewed |
| Power looms automated 98% of labor per yard of cloth, yet factory weaving jobs increased during the 19th century | Bessen historical analysis | 2015 | Historical/academic |
| 472,000 bank tellers employed in 2018 (>10% increase since 2000 despite ATM proliferation) | BLS data | 2018 | Government data |
Key mechanism: Automation reduces unit cost, which reduces price, which increases demand, which can increase total employment even as per-unit labor decreases. Jobs transform rather than disappear.
2. Small Team Economics
2.1 Landmark Small-Team Exits
| Company | Employees at Event | Valuation/Price | Event | Year | Revenue per Employee |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 13 | $1B acquisition (Facebook) | Acquisition | 2012 | $76.9M/employee (by valuation) | |
| 55 | $19B acquisition (Facebook) | Acquisition | 2014 | $345M/employee (by valuation) | |
| Mojang (Minecraft) | ~50 | $2.5B acquisition (Microsoft) | Acquisition | 2014 | $50M/employee (by valuation) |
| Craigslist | ~50 | $694M revenue (peak) | Operating | 2024 | ~$13.9M/employee |
Source: Company filings, SEC disclosures, and press reporting at time of acquisition. Mojang notably never raised venture capital and earned nearly $1B in profit before selling.
2.2 Modern AI Companies: Extreme Efficiency
| Company | Employees | Revenue (Annual) | Revenue per Employee | Founded | Funding |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Midjourney | ~40 | $500M (2025 est.) | ~$12.5M | 2022 | $0 (self-funded) |
| Cursor (Anysphere) | <20 | ~$500M ARR (2025) | ~$25M+ | 2022 | VC-backed |
| Mistral AI | 276 | $600M ARR (2025 proj.) | ~$2.2M | 2023 | $640M raised |
| Mercor | est. small | $4.5M revenue/employee | $4.5M | 2023 | VC-backed |
Sources: Sacra research, GetLatka, CB Insights, PitchBook, company announcements. Revenue figures for private companies are estimates based on industry reporting.
2.3 AI Startups vs. Traditional SaaS
| Metric | AI Startups (Top 10) | Traditional SaaS Leaders | Multiple |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue per employee | $3.48M average | $610K average | 5.7x |
| Revenue per employee (excl. outliers) | $2.47M | $200K (SaaS benchmark) | 12.4x |
| Employees per $1M revenue | 0.29 | 2-5 | 7-8x fewer |
| Time to $100M ARR | Often <2 years | Typically 5-7 years | 3-4x faster |
Source: Analysis by Growth Mind (Substack), Pavilion, and Lucidity Insights aggregating data from AI startups reaching $100M+ ARR with fewer than 100 employees (2024-2025).
2.4 Big Tech Revenue per Employee (Comparison)
| Company | Revenue per Employee (FY2024-25) | Source |
|---|---|---|
| NVIDIA | $3.6M | Company filings |
| Meta | $2.2M | Company filings |
| Microsoft | $1.8M | Company filings |
| Apple | $2.4M | Company filings |
| Craigslist | ~$13.9M | Estimated from revenue/headcount |
| OnlyFans | $37.6M (42 employees) | Company-reported |
Key insight: AI-native companies are achieving revenue-per-employee ratios that rival or exceed the largest tech companies, with teams orders of magnitude smaller.
3. Universal Basic Income / Universal Basic Compute
3.1 Finland Basic Income Experiment (2017-2018)
| Parameter | Detail |
|---|---|
| Design | Nation-wide RCT; 2,000 unemployed recipients; EUR 560/month; no obligation to seek work; payments not reduced if recipients found employment |
| Employment | No significant employment difference in Year 1; 6-day average employment increase in Year 2 |
| Entrepreneurship | Self-employment income ~1 percentage point higher for recipients vs. control |
| Wellbeing | Significantly higher subjective wellbeing across multiple measures; less mental strain; greater life satisfaction |
| Engagement | 83%+ of recipients voluntarily registered with employment services despite no obligation |
Source: Kela (Social Insurance Institution of Finland), "Results of Finland's Basic Income Experiment 2017-2018," published 2020. Peer-reviewed publications in multiple journals.
Caveat: Sample limited to unemployed individuals; 2-year duration limits generalizability to permanent programs.
3.2 GiveDirectly Kenya UBI Study (2017-ongoing)
| Parameter | Detail |
|---|---|
| Design | World's longest-running UBI study; 23,000 individuals across 195 villages; $22.50/month for 12 years, 2 years, or one-time $500; randomized with control group |
| Enterprise creation | 34.5% increase in number of enterprises among long-term recipients |
| Enterprise gross revenue | 59.6% increase |
| Enterprise net revenue | 98.7% increase |
| Self-employment | 64% of recipients reported being self-employed at study end |
| Work hours | No reduction in total work; significant shift from wage work to self-employed work |
| Best format | Long-term monthly payments: best for food security. Lump sums: best for investment and entrepreneurship |
Source: Banerjee, Faye, Krueger, Niehaus, Suri, "Effects of a Universal Basic Income during the Pandemic," published via IPA and NBER (2023-2024). Peer-reviewed.
3.3 Stockton SEED Program (2019-2021)
| Parameter | Detail |
|---|---|
| Design | 125 recipients in low-income neighborhoods; $500/month for 24 months; randomized with control group |
| Full-time employment | Recipients: 28% to 40% (+12pp). Control: 32% to 37% (+5pp). Net effect: +7 percentage points |
| Spending | <1% spent on alcohol or tobacco; nearly all went to food, clothing, home goods, utilities, and transportation |
| Mental health | Reduced anxiety and depression |
| Financial stability | Increased liquidity and ability to handle unexpected expenses |
Source: West and Castro Baker, "Preliminary Analysis: SEED's First Year," Stockton Economic Empowerment Demonstration, 2021. Subsequently peer-reviewed.
3.4 OpenResearch Study (Sam Altman-backed, 2021-2024)
| Parameter | Detail |
|---|---|
| Design | 1,000 recipients in Texas and Illinois; $1,000/month for 3 years; 2,000-person control group receiving $50/month |
| Work hours | Recipients worked 1.3 fewer hours per week (marginal reduction) |
| Job searching | Recipients were 10% MORE likely to be actively searching for employment |
| Agency | Increased likelihood of starting businesses, pursuing education, budgeting for future |
| Substance use (males) | 41% decrease in dangerous situations while under the influence; 81% decrease in non-prescribed painkiller use; 45% decrease in drinking interfering with responsibilities |
| Health | More doctor visits and dental care; no significant aggregate health improvement detected |
Source: OpenResearch, three published research papers (2024). Largest US basic income study to date.
3.5 Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (1982-present)
| Parameter | Detail |
|---|---|
| Design | Universal annual payment to all Alaska residents; 40+ years of continuous data; varies by year (typically $1,000-$3,000) |
| Employment | No effect on aggregate employment (Jones and Marinescu, NBER Working Paper 24312) |
| Part-time work | Increased by 1.8 percentage points (17% relative increase) |
| Mechanism | Cash stimulates local economy via general equilibrium effects; non-tradable sectors show more positive employment response |
| Poverty | Long-term poverty reduction documented (Berman, 2024, Poverty & Public Policy) |
Source: Jones and Marinescu, "The Labor Market Impacts of Universal and Permanent Cash Transfers: Evidence from the Alaska Permanent Fund," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2022. Peer-reviewed.
3.6 Negative Income Tax Experiments (1968-1982)
| Experiment | Location | Participants | Work Reduction |
|---|---|---|---|
| New Jersey | NJ & PA | 1,216 families | 2-4 weeks/year |
| Rural | Iowa & NC | 809 families | 2-4 weeks/year |
| Gary | Indiana | 1,780 households | Wives: 0-27%; Single mothers: 15-30% (0-166 hours/year) |
| SIME/DIME | Seattle & Denver | 4,800 families | 2-4 weeks/year average |
Source: Overview of the Final Report of the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiment, ASPE (HHS); Burtless, "Income: A Survey of Experimental Evidence," Boston Fed Conference Volume 30. Peer-reviewed.
Key finding across all experiments: Even in the worst-case interpretation, work reductions were modest (2-4 weeks per year), and much of the reduction was attributable to longer job searches resulting in better job matches, increased education enrollment, and increased caregiving time.
3.7 Summary: The "Laziness" Myth vs. Data
| Study | Did recipients stop working? | Key nuance |
|---|---|---|
| Finland | No | Wellbeing improved; employment similar |
| Kenya (GiveDirectly) | No | Entrepreneurship surged dramatically |
| Stockton | No; employment INCREASED | Full-time employment rose 12pp |
| OpenResearch | Marginal reduction (1.3 hrs/week) | Job searching increased 10% |
| Alaska (40+ years) | No aggregate effect | Part-time work increased |
| NIT experiments | Modest (2-4 weeks/year) | Better job matches, more education |
Conclusion: Across 6 major studies spanning 4 decades, 6 countries, and tens of thousands of participants, no study found that unconditional cash transfers caused significant workforce withdrawal. The "laziness" hypothesis is empirically unsupported.
4. Cooperative and Stakeholder Models
4.1 Mondragon Corporation
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 total sales | EUR 11.213B | Mondragon annual report, TU Lankide |
| Workforce | ~70,000 workers | Mondragon corporate communications |
| Industrial co-op turnover | EUR 5.02B | Mondragon 2024 results |
| Industrial co-op net income | EUR 267M | Mondragon 2024 results |
| Distribution sales | EUR 6.193B | Mondragon 2024 results |
| International sales share | 73% of industrial sales | Mondragon 2024 results |
| Pay ratio (highest to lowest) | Typically 6:1 to 8:1 | Academic literature (vs. 351:1 S&P 500 average in US) |
| Year-on-year sales growth (2024) | +1.6% | Mondragon annual report |
Source: Mondragon Corporation Annual Results, reported via TU Lankide and Co-operative News. Company-reported data.
4.2 Worker Cooperative Survival Rates
| Country | Co-op 3-Year Survival Rate | All Business 3-Year Survival Rate | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| France | 80-90% | 66% | Perotin, "What Do We Really Know About Workers' Cooperatives?" (2016) |
| Italy (worker buyouts) | 87% | 48% | Perotin (2016) |
Additional findings from Perotin:
- During the 2008 crisis, French worker co-op employment INCREASED by 4.2% while employment in conventional firms DECREASED by 0.7%.
- Worker cooperatives have similar sensitivity to business cycles as conventional firms, but employment is more stable because workers can accept temporary wage cuts (and later restore them), while conventional firms must lay off.
Source: Virginie Perotin, "What Do We Really Know About Workers' Cooperatives?" University of Leeds, published by Co-operatives UK (2016). Peer-reviewed academic research.
4.3 ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plan) Performance
| Finding | Source | Year | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meta-analysis of 102 studies (56,984 firms): small but positive and statistically significant relationship between employee ownership and firm performance | Multiple researchers, aggregated | 2013 | Peer-reviewed meta-analysis |
| 4-5% average productivity increase in the year of ESOP adoption | Studies from 1980s-1990s | Various | Peer-reviewed |
| Federal performance rating (CPARS): 100% ESOP firms rated higher than all other firms | 2024 NCEO study | 2024 | Industry research |
| ESOP voluntary quit rates at ~1/3 of national average | NCEO/ESCA study | 2023 | Industry research |
| Median ESOP retirement account: $80,500 vs. $30,000 non-ESOP (2.7x) | NCEO study | 2023 | Industry research |
| ESOP companies showed superior workforce retention, benefits, and firm performance during COVID-19 | NCEO food industry study | 2022 | Industry research |
Source: National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO) research reports (2022-2024); Rutgers University global ESOP study (2024).
4.4 Credit Unions vs. Commercial Banks
| Metric | Credit Unions (2024) | Commercial Banks | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Average dividends paid per member | $264/year | N/A (profits to shareholders) | Industry data |
| Fee income per member | $71 | Significantly higher (recurring fees) | Industry comparison |
| Membership growth (Q4 2024) | +2.2% (3M new members) | Varies | Industry data |
| Structure | Not-for-profit, member-owned | For-profit, shareholder-owned | Structural |
| CD rates | Generally higher | Generally lower | Rate comparison sites |
Source: Credit union industry data aggregated from NCUA reports and CreditUnions.com analysis (2024).
4.5 John Lewis Partnership (UK)
| Metric | Value (FY 2024/25) | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Partnership sales | GBP 12.8B (+3% YoY) | JLP Annual Report |
| Total revenue | GBP 11.1B (+3%) | JLP Annual Report |
| Profit before tax | GBP 97M (+73% YoY) | JLP Annual Report |
| Profit before tax & exceptionals | GBP 126M (tripled from GBP 42M) | JLP Annual Report |
| Operating profit margin improvement | +0.9 percentage points to 2.0% | JLP Annual Report |
| Pay increases | GBP 114M (2025), following GBP 116M (2024) | JLP Annual Report |
Source: John Lewis Partnership plc Annual Report and Accounts 2024/25. Company-reported, audited data.
Caveat: JLP has faced challenges in recent years, including zero partner bonus for 2023/24 and 2024/25. The cooperative model does not guarantee superior financial performance in all periods.
4.6 Platform Cooperatives
| Platform | Sector | Key Differentiator | Scale |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stocksy | Stock photography | 50% royalty on standard licenses; 75% on extended (vs. ~15-30% at Getty/Shutterstock) | ~1,000 contributing artists; ~$10.7M revenue (2016) |
| Resonate | Music streaming | Stream-to-own model; higher per-stream payments than Spotify | ~2,000 members (Jan 2024) |
| Up & Go | Cleaning services | Worker-owned; workers keep 95% of earnings | Operating in NYC |
Source: Platform cooperative case studies from MIT Center for Civic Media, Start.coop, and direct reporting. Platform cooperatives remain small-scale relative to incumbent platforms.
5. The Broken Creator Economy
5.1 Platform Take Rates
| Platform | Creator Share | Platform Take | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spotify | ~$0.003-0.005/stream | ~70% of subscriber revenue | Spotify Loud & Clear (2024) |
| YouTube (long-form) | 55% of ad revenue | 45% | YouTube Partner Program terms |
| Apple App Store | 70% (85% for small devs) | 30% (15% for small devs) | Apple policy |
| Google Play | 70% (85% for small devs) | 30% (15% for small devs) | Google policy |
| OnlyFans | 80% | 20% | OnlyFans terms |
| Patreon | 88-95% | 5-12% | Patreon pricing tiers |
| TikTok (Creator Fund, old) | $0.02-$0.04/1,000 views | N/A (fixed pool) | Creator reporting |
| TikTok (Creator Rewards, new) | $0.40-$1.00/1,000 views | N/A | TikTok program terms |
| Twitch | 50% of subscriptions (standard); 60% (Partner Plus) | 50% (standard); 40% (Partner Plus) | Twitch terms |
| DoorDash (from restaurants) | 70-85% | 15-30% commission | DoorDash merchant terms |
| Uber Eats (from restaurants) | 70-85% | 15-30% commission | UberEats merchant terms |
5.2 Spotify: The Math of Poverty
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Average per-stream payout | $0.003-$0.005 | Industry consensus, TuneCore, iMusician (2024-2025) |
| Streams needed to earn $1 | ~230 | Calculated from per-stream rate |
| Streams needed to earn US minimum wage ($15,080/year) | ~3.77 million to ~5.03 million | Calculated |
| Streams needed to earn US median income ($59,384/year) | ~11.9 million to ~19.8 million | Calculated |
| Minimum stream threshold for ANY royalties (since 2024) | 1,000 streams in prior 12 months | Spotify policy |
5.3 Creator Income Distribution
| Platform | Finding | Source |
|---|---|---|
| All platforms | 57% of full-time creators earn below US living wage (~$44,000/year) | Cookie Finance 2025 Creator Earnings Report |
| All platforms | Only 4% of global creators earn >$100,000/year | Industry aggregate data |
| OnlyFans | Average creator earns ~$1,570/year ($131/month) | Calculated from total payouts / creator count |
| OnlyFans | Median creator earns ~$180/month | Industry analysis |
| OnlyFans | Top 1% earn ~$49,000/year; top 10% earn ~75% of all platform revenue | OnlyFans economics analysis |
| Twitch | Top 1% of streamers received >50% of all money paid on platform (2021 leak) | Twitch data leak analysis |
| Twitch | Small streamers (5-10 avg viewers): $50-$200/month | Industry reporting |
| Substack | 17,000+ paid writers; top 10 authors collectively earn $40M/year | Substack/Backlinko data |
| Substack | Annualized gross writer revenue: ~$450M total across all writers | Industry estimate |
| TikTok | Creator reported $123 for 16 million views | Creator self-reporting |
5.4 The "1,000 True Fans" Theory vs. Reality
Kevin Kelly's 2008 theory: 1,000 fans x $100/year = $100,000 sustainable income.
| Challenge | Evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Average music spending per fan is only $109/year, with 54% going to live events | Nielsen, 2014 | Industry research |
| Fans spread spending across multiple creators, not one | Behavioral economics research | Academic |
| Theory requires existing financial stability to pursue | Dave Karpf, "The Hollow Core of 1,000 True Fans" | Analysis/criticism |
| Conversion rate to paid on Substack averages 3% (1-2% for large publications) | Substack aggregate data | Platform data |
| Implication: To get 1,000 paying fans at 3% conversion, you need ~33,000 free followers | Calculated | Derived |
5.5 The Middle-Class Creator Problem
The creator economy exhibits extreme power-law dynamics:
- A tiny fraction of creators earn substantial income
- The vast majority earn below poverty wages
- Platform algorithms amplify this inequality by favoring already-popular content
- Mid-tier creators are squeezed: too many followers for personal connection, too few for algorithmic amplification
- Platform take rates compound the problem by extracting 20-45% from already meager earnings
6. Middleman Value Extraction
6.1 Agriculture
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| US farmer share of overall food dollar | 15.9 cents (2023) | USDA Economic Research Service, Food Dollar Series |
| Farmer share of food-at-home dollar | 24.3 cents (2023) | USDA ERS |
| Farmer share of food-away-from-home dollar | 5.4 cents (2023) | USDA ERS |
| Marketing share per food-at-home dollar | 75.7 cents | USDA ERS |
| Retailer share | 14.7 cents per food dollar | USDA ERS |
| Foodservice establishment share | 31.5 cents per food dollar | USDA ERS |
Implication: When you buy food at a restaurant, the farmer who grew it receives 5.4 cents of every dollar. The remaining 94.6 cents goes to intermediaries: processors, transporters, wholesalers, retailers, and food service establishments.
Source: USDA ERS Food Dollar Series and Price Spreads from Farm to Consumer, official government data (2023, most recent available).
6.2 Real Estate
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Standard US real estate commission | 5-6% of sale price | NAR/industry standard |
| Total annual commission extraction (US) | ~$100B/year | Industry estimates cited in NAR settlement litigation |
| NAR settlement (2024) | $418M settlement; cooperative compensation rule eliminated | Federal court filing |
| Projected commission reduction post-settlement | Up to 30% | Industry analysis |
| US commission rate vs. other developed countries | Exceptionally high (UK ~1-3%, Australia ~2-3%) | International comparison |
| Agents potentially losing income from reforms | Up to 1.6 million | Industry estimates |
Source: Burnett v. National Association of Realtors settlement documents (2024); industry reporting via Fortune, CBS News.
6.3 Healthcare Administration (US)
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Administrative spending as % of US healthcare | 15-30% (varies by definition) | Health Affairs, multiple studies |
| Hospital administrative expenses (2023) | $687B vs. $346B in direct patient care (2:1 ratio) | Trilliant Health study |
| Hospital administrative expenses as % of total | 17.0% ($166.1B for 5,639 hospitals) | PMC/NCBI research |
| US healthcare admin costs vs. Canada | US: ~34%; Canada: ~17% | Multiple comparative studies |
| Total US healthcare spending (2024) | Growing at 8.2% | CMS estimates via AHA |
Source: Health Affairs policy brief, "The Role of Administrative Waste in Excess US Health Spending" (2022); Trilliant Health market research (2023); CMS National Health Expenditure data.
Implication: Excess administrative costs in US healthcare amount to ~2-8% of total healthcare spending compared to peer nations, representing hundreds of billions in potentially eliminable intermediation.
6.4 Higher Education Administration
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Instructional spending share of university budgets | Decreased from 41% to 29% since 1980 | Heritage Foundation analysis of NCES data |
| Admin spending per student growth (1993-2007) | +61% | Department of Education data |
| Faculty-to-administrator ratio decline (1990-2012) | -40% (from ~2:1 to ~1:1 at public research universities) | NCES data analysis |
| Non-instructional spending growth (2010-2018) | Student services: +29%; Administration: +19%; Instruction: +17% | DOE data |
| Admin spending per student (2016-2021) | +6.3% ($3,549 to $3,771) while instructional spending fell 4.7% ($14,352 to $13,685) | Stateline/ACTA analysis |
Source: American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA); National Center for Education Statistics (NCES); Heritage Foundation analysis. Government and non-profit data.
6.5 Ride-Sharing
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Uber/Lyft average platform take rate | ~40% on average | NELP (National Employment Law Project) analysis |
| Maximum observed take on individual rides | 65-70% | NELP analysis |
| Lyft's "70% guarantee" (2024) | Effectively meaningless after subtracting unspecified costs and fees | NELP investigation |
| Average Uber driver weekly earnings decline (2023 to 2024) | $531 to $513/week | NELP/industry data |
| Lyft driver earnings decline (2024) | -14% vs. 2023 | NELP data |
Source: National Employment Law Project, "Unpacking Uber & Lyft's Predatory Take Rates" (2025 update). Advocacy research based on driver earnings data.
6.6 Food Delivery
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| DoorDash commission range | 15-30% per order | DoorDash merchant terms |
| UberEats commission range | 6-30% per order | UberEats merchant terms |
| True cost including hidden fees | Can exceed 40% of revenue | ActiveMenus industry analysis |
Source: Platform merchant agreements and ActiveMenus cost analysis (2024).
6.7 Financial Services
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Financial sector as % of US GDP | Grew from 2.5% (1947) to 7.9% (2007); ~7.2% (2014) | FRED/BEA data; Greenwood & Scharfstein, JEP 2013 |
| Total financial sector compensation as % of GDP | ~9% (all-time high) | Academic research aggregated by TCF |
| Estimated excess income consumed by finance sector | 2% of GDP (~$280B/year for US alone) | Greenwood & Scharfstein, "The Growth of Finance," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2013 |
| Typical advisory fee (AUM) | 1.05% median | 2024 industry survey |
| Financial plan cost | Median $3,000 (2024) | Kitces Research |
Source: Greenwood and Scharfstein, "The Growth of Finance," Journal of Economic Perspectives 27(2), 2013. Peer-reviewed. FRED data from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
6.8 Total Middleman Extraction Summary
| Sector | Estimated Annual US Extraction | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Real estate commissions | ~$100B | NAR litigation data |
| Healthcare excess administration | $200-600B+ | Health Affairs (varies by methodology) |
| Financial services excess costs | ~$280B | Greenwood & Scharfstein (JEP 2013) |
| Agricultural middlemen | Implicit in 84.1 cents of every food dollar | USDA ERS (2023) |
| Ride-sharing platform take | ~40% of all fares | NELP analysis |
| Food delivery platform take | 15-40% of restaurant revenue | Platform terms |
| Higher education admin bloat | Unknown total; growing faster than instruction | NCES data |
Conservative estimate of addressable middleman extraction in the US alone: $500B-$1T+ annually.
6.9 Global Consolidated Rent-Seeking Table
| Sector | Annual Extraction | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Financial intermediation (global) | $6.8T | McKinsey Global Banking Review 2024 |
| Global payments processing | $2.5T (subset of above) | McKinsey Global Payments Report 2025 |
| Recruitment/staffing (global) | $525-584B | The Insight Partners / Zion Market Research |
| US healthcare admin waste | $285-570B | Health Affairs |
| Insurance brokerage (global) | $180B | Insurance Times 2024 |
| US real estate commissions | $100-170B | KBW / BEA |
| App store commissions (Apple+Google) | $30-40B | Industry estimates |
| Academic publishing (global, ~40% margins) | $30B | Market research firms |
Global total: $8-9 trillion annually in intermediation costs (avoiding double-count between financial intermediation and payments). A substantial fraction (30-60%) is rent-seeking amenable to technological disruption.
7. Compute Cost Trends and Viability
7.1 GPU Price-Performance (FLOP/s per Dollar)
| Finding | Source | Year | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| FLOP/s per $ doubles every ~2.5 years (all GPUs) | Epoch AI, "Trends in GPU Price-Performance" (470 GPU models, 2006-2021) | 2022 | Research organization |
| FLOP/s per $ doubles every 2.07 years (ML-focused GPUs) | Epoch AI | 2022 | Research organization |
| Performance per dollar improves ~30% each year | Epoch AI | Updated 2024 | Research organization |
| 2025 GPU price is ~26% of 2019 price (74% decline in 6 years) | Epoch AI analysis | 2025 | Research organization |
| 1000x improvement in single GPU AI inference performance over past decade | NVIDIA corporate claims ("Huang's Law") | 2024 | Company-reported |
| AI token cost declining ~10x per year for previous-generation models | Jensen Huang, NVIDIA earnings calls | 2025 | Company-reported |
Source: Epoch AI (primary academic source); NVIDIA corporate communications. Epoch AI analysis is based on public GPU specification data and is peer-reviewed within the AI safety research community.
Caveat: Huang's 1000x claim decomposes to: 16x from better number handling, 12.5x from reduced-precision arithmetic, 2x from sparsity, 2.5x from process node improvements. This is real but specific to AI inference workloads, not general-purpose compute.
7.2 Storage Costs
| Period | Cost per GB | Annual Decline Rate | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | $0.114/GB | - | Backblaze analysis |
| 2010-2017 | Declining | ~11% annual decrease | Backblaze/industry data |
| 2017-2022 | Declining | ~9% annual decrease | Backblaze/industry data |
| 2024 | ~$0.014/GB | - | Backblaze analysis |
| Overall decline (2009-2024) | 87.4% decrease | ~0.52% monthly | Backblaze analysis |
| Projected milestone | $0.01/GB (~$10/TB) by mid-2025 | - | Backblaze projection |
Source: Backblaze, "The Cost Per Gigabyte of Hard Drives Over Time" (continuously updated dataset). Company-reported based on their own purchasing data as a major storage buyer.
20-year perspective: Storage costs have fallen by >90% over the past two decades, with brief interruptions (2011 Thailand flood). The long-term trend is exceptionally consistent.
7.3 Bandwidth / Internet Transit Costs
| Year | Average Transit Price (per Mbps) | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 2010 | ~$5.00/Mbps | DrPeering.net |
| 2012 | $2.34/Mbps | DrPeering.net |
| 2022-2025 | 100 GigE prices fell 12% CAGR | TeleGeography |
| 2025 | $0.08-$0.09/Mbps (400 GigE, US/Europe) | TeleGeography |
| Long-term trend | ~30% annual price decline | DrPeering.net historical analysis |
Source: DrPeering.net (William B. Norton), "Internet Transit Prices: Historical and Projections"; TeleGeography IP Transit Pricing reports.
Key dynamic: Transit prices decline ~30% per year, but traffic grows ~50% per year, meaning total spend can still increase even as unit costs drop.
7.4 Cloud Compute (AWS)
| Finding | Source | Year | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| 66 price reductions from 2006 to mid-2018 | AWS corporate history | 2018 | Company-reported |
| S3 annual price reduction factor: 14.9% | Academic analysis (ICEAA) | 2019 | Conference paper |
| EC2 annual price reduction factor: 8.2% | Academic analysis (ICEAA) | 2019 | Conference paper |
| Recent trend reversal: EC2 ML instances (p5e) increased from $34.61/hr to $39.80/hr (2024-2025) | AWS pricing changes | 2025 | Company-reported |
Source: AWS corporate announcements; Souiri, "Forecasting Future Amazon Web Services Pricing," ICEAA Conference (2019).
Important caveat: The era of perpetual cloud price declines may be ending for specialized AI compute. General-purpose compute continues to decline, but AI-specific instances (with NVIDIA GPUs) have seen price increases in 2024-2025 due to demand exceeding supply.
7.5 Compute Cost Projection for UCU
Based on the empirical trends:
| Assumption | Basis |
|---|---|
| GPU FLOP/s per $ doubles every 2-2.5 years | Epoch AI data |
| Storage cost halves every ~6-8 years | Backblaze data |
| Bandwidth cost declines ~30% annually | DrPeering.net data |
| AI inference cost declines ~10x per year for previous-gen models | NVIDIA/Huang claim |
Projection: If 1 UCU is pegged to a meaningful unit of compute (e.g., 1 hour of a standard AI inference workload), its cost basis should decline by approximately 5-10x per decade for general compute, and potentially faster (100-1000x per decade) for AI-specific workloads. This means that compute-backed currency becomes progressively MORE valuable in purchasing-power terms as the underlying substrate becomes cheaper--analogous to how productivity-linked currencies strengthen over time.
Risk: Cloud provider pricing power and demand surges (as seen in 2024-2025 AI boom) can temporarily reverse hardware cost declines at the service layer.
8. Network Effects and Platform Growth
8.1 Growth Benchmarks
| Platform | Time to 1M Users | Time to 100M Users | Time to 1B Users | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ~10 months (2004-2005) | ~4 years (2004-2008) | ~8 years (2004-2012) | Company milestones | |
| N/A | ~5 years | ~8 years (2009-2017) | Company milestones | |
| Discord | N/A | ~5 years (2015-2020) | N/A (656M registered, 259M MAU as of 2025) | Company reporting |
| Facebook Messenger | N/A | Was at 100M; grew to 1.3B in 3 years (2013-2016) | ~3 years (100M to 1.3B) | Company milestones |
8.2 Discord Growth Case Study
| Milestone | Value | Year |
|---|---|---|
| Active users | 56M | May 2019 |
| Active users | 100M+ | 2020 (COVID) |
| Registered users | 300M+ | 2020 |
| Growth rate (2017-2020) | 566% | 3-year period |
| Monthly active users | 259M | 2025 |
| Registered users | 656M | 2025 |
| Daily messages | 1.1B | 2025 |
| Average daily time per user | 94 minutes | 2025 |
Source: Discord company announcements; DemandSage, BusinessOfApps aggregations.
8.3 Network Effect Taxonomy for Two-Sided Marketplaces
| Strategy | Description | Example | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hyperlocal network effects | Value accrues within a geographic radius; must be rebuilt city by city | Uber | Breadcrumb.vc analysis |
| Cross-border network effects | Supply in one geography benefits demand globally | Airbnb | Harvard D3 analysis |
| Single-player utility | Product is useful even without network; network amplifies value | Slack, Discord | nfx.com framework |
| Viral invitation loops | Each user naturally invites others through product usage | WhatsApp, Facebook | Andrew Chen / a16z |
| Critical mass threshold | Minimum user density required for the network to become self-sustaining | Varies by market | Economic theory |
8.4 Adoption Curves: Hard Data
M-Pesa (Kenya, 2007-2024):
| Date | Users | % Adult Population |
|---|---|---|
| March 2007 | 0 (launch) | 0% |
| End 2007 | ~1M | ~5% |
| Aug 2008 | ~5M | ~25% (43% of households) |
| Dec 2009 | ~12M | ~65% of households |
| Dec 2011 | 17M | ~70% of adults |
| 2024 | 50M+ (across Africa) | Near-universal |
Critical mass at ~25-35% of adult population (mid-2008). 78% of users cited social reasons as primary adoption driver. Source: NBER Working Paper 16721.
UPI (India, 2016-2025):
| Period | Monthly Transactions |
|---|---|
| Aug 2016 | 93,000 (launch) |
| FY 2019-20 | 12.5B annual |
| FY 2023-24 | 131B annual |
| 2025 | 228B annual (est.) |
12,700x growth in 8 years. 500M+ active users. Triggered by demonetization (Nov 2016) + zero fees + interoperability mandate. UPI now processes 50% of world's real-time digital transactions. Source: PIB India, Wikipedia.
WeChat Pay (China, 2013-2023): From 30M to 100M users in ONE MONTH (Feb 2014) via Red Envelope campaign during Chinese New Year — 16M digital envelopes sent in the first 24 hours. Jack Ma called it "a Pearl Harbor moment." Users linked bank cards to send/receive, permanently activating payment capability. Reached 1.13B users by 2023. Source: Wikipedia, Fast Company.
Facebook (2004-2012): 1M → 1B in 9 years. Achieved 80%+ penetration at Harvard within weeks. Critical mass at ~15% of target community. The Sept 2006 opening (from 12M college users) triggered 22-month sprint to 100M. Source: a16z, Wikipedia.
Universal pattern: Critical mass is not reached through gradual linear growth but through a SPECIFIC TRIGGERING MECHANISM — agent density (M-Pesa), cultural tradition (WeChat), exogenous shock (UPI demonetization), or controlled saturation (Facebook). You engineer a trigger event that tips past critical mass.
8.5 Viral Coefficient
| Concept | Definition | Threshold | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Viral coefficient (K) | Number of new users the average user generates through referrals | K > 1 for viral growth | Standard product analytics |
| Facebook campus strategy | Limited launch on college campuses created density before expanding | N/A | Company history |
| Airbnb bootstrap | Cross-posted to Craigslist; used Facebook Connect for trust | N/A | Platform case studies |
Methodological Notes
Data Quality Assessment
| Source Type | Examples | Reliability | Caveats |
|---|---|---|---|
| Peer-reviewed studies | Alaska PFD (Jones & Marinescu), Perotin co-op research | High | May lag current conditions |
| Government data | USDA ERS, BLS, NCES, CMS | High | Methodological definitions vary |
| Industry reports | McKinsey, Epoch AI | Medium-High | May reflect funder interests |
| Company-reported | NVIDIA, Mondragon, GitHub | Medium | Self-serving bias possible |
| Creator self-reporting | TikTok earnings, Twitch estimates | Low-Medium | Selection bias, small samples |
| Aggregated estimates | Total middleman extraction | Low-Medium | Methodologies vary widely |
Key Counterarguments to Address
-
AI productivity gains may be overstated. The GitHub Copilot RCT is promising but narrow (JavaScript tasks). Real-world software development involves architecture decisions, debugging, and coordination that AI handles poorly. GitClear data suggests AI may decrease code quality.
-
Small team economics may not scale. Instagram and WhatsApp were acquired precisely BECAUSE they could not monetize independently. Post-acquisition, both required massive teams. The question is whether small teams can build sustainable businesses, not just acquisition targets.
-
UBI experiments are short-term. The longest study (GiveDirectly Kenya) is still running. Most experiments lasted 2-3 years. Long-term behavioral effects remain uncertain. The Alaska PFD ($1,000-3,000/year) provides the longest dataset but at amounts too small to constitute a living wage.
-
Cooperatives remain niche. Despite Mondragon's success, worker cooperatives represent a tiny fraction of global economic output. Scaling challenges (capital access, governance complexity) are real.
-
Compute costs may not keep declining. The 2024-2025 AI boom has caused GPU shortages and price increases at the cloud layer. Energy costs for AI training are growing rapidly. Environmental constraints may limit the cost curve.
-
Network effects are difficult to bootstrap. For every Facebook, there are thousands of failed social networks. Survivorship bias is extreme in this domain.
Citation Index
Academic / Peer-Reviewed
- Banerjee, Faye, Krueger, Niehaus, Suri. "Effects of a Universal Basic Income during the Pandemic." NBER/IPA, 2023-2024.
- Berman. "A rising tide that lifts all boats: Long-term effects of the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend on poverty." Poverty & Public Policy, 2024.
- Bessen, James. "Toil and Technology." IMF Finance & Development, March 2015.
- Greenwood and Scharfstein. "The Growth of Finance." Journal of Economic Perspectives 27(2), 2013.
- Jones and Marinescu. "The Labor Market Impacts of Universal and Permanent Cash Transfers: Evidence from the Alaska Permanent Fund." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2022.
- Peng et al. "The Impact of AI on Developer Productivity: Evidence from GitHub Copilot." arXiv:2302.06590, 2023.
- Perotin, Virginie. "What Do We Really Know About Workers' Cooperatives?" Co-operatives UK/University of Leeds, 2016.
- West and Castro Baker. "Preliminary Analysis: SEED's First Year." Stockton Economic Empowerment Demonstration, 2021.
Government / Official Data
- Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Employment data.
- Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). National Health Expenditure Data, 2024.
- Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). Financial sector GDP data.
- Kela (Finnish Social Insurance Institution). Basic Income Experiment Results, 2020.
- National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). Higher education spending data.
- USDA Economic Research Service. Food Dollar Series and Price Spreads, 2023.
Industry Reports
- Epoch AI. "Trends in GPU Price-Performance." 2022-2024.
- McKinsey Global Institute. "Notes from the AI Frontier," 2018; "The Economic Potential of Generative AI," 2023; "Agents, Robots, and Us," 2025.
- National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO). Multiple ESOP studies, 2022-2024.
- National Employment Law Project (NELP). "Unpacking Uber & Lyft's Predatory Take Rates," 2025.
- OpenResearch. Unconditional Cash Study results, 2024.
Company-Reported / Platform Data
- Backblaze. Hard drive cost-per-gigabyte analysis (ongoing).
- DrPeering.net. Internet transit pricing historical data.
- GitHub/Microsoft. Copilot productivity studies.
- Mondragon Corporation. Annual results 2024.
- NVIDIA/Jensen Huang. Compute cost projections.
- Spotify Loud & Clear. Creator payout data.
- TeleGeography. IP transit pricing reports.
This document was compiled on 2026-02-23 from publicly available sources. All figures should be independently verified before use in formal publications. Data points marked as "company-reported" may contain self-serving bias. Peer-reviewed sources are preferred where available.